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Too high and too low: The problems with energy prices in the EU
Agata Łoskot-Strachota
On 11 October, the top executives of ten European energy companies, which jointly own abo-
ut half of the European Union’s electricity generating capacity, warned that “energy security 
is no longer guaranteed” and once again called for changes to EU energy policy. Due to per-
sistent adverse conditions in the energy market (linked to, for example, the exceptionally low 
wholesale energy prices) more and more conventional power plants are being closed down. 
According to sector representatives, this could lead to energy shortages being seen as early 
as this winter. Meanwhile, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph published in September 
of this year, the European industry commissioner Antonio Tajani warned – in a rather alarmist 
tone – of the disastrous consequences the rising energy prices could have on European indu-
stry. Amongst the reasons for the high prices of energy, Tajani mentioned the overambitious 
pace and methods used to increase the share of renewables in the sector. In a similar vein, 
EU President Herman Van Rompuy has highlighted the need to reduce energy costs as a top 
priority for EU energy policy1.
The price of energy has become one of the central issues in the current EU energy debate. 
The high consumer price of energy – which has been rising steadily over the past several years 
– poses a serious challenge to both household and industrial users. Meanwhile, the declining 
wholesale prices are affecting the cost-effectiveness of energy production and the profits 
of energy companies. The current difficulties, however, are first and foremost a symptom of 
much wider problems related to the functioning of both the EU energy market as well as to 
the EU’s climate and energy policies.
The global context of the EU’s energy 
problems1
For the past several years, the EU’s energy sec-
tor has been facing major challenges. As with 
other sectors of the EU economy, the energy 
sector has felt the impact of the economic cri-
sis (including another year-on-year drop in EU 
1 For further details of the CEOs’ proposals and of the 
press conference in Brussels, see: http://www.gdfsuez.
com/en/shareholders/calendar/press-conference-eu-en-
ergy-policy-ceo/. Prior to the press conference, the CEOs 
spoke to the European Parliament (on 10 September 
2013) and to the EU Energy Council (in May 2013).
GDP figures, and the declining role of energy-
-intensive sectors2). This has contributed to, for 
example, a continuing slump in energy demand. 
According to Eurostat, the consumption of both 
primary and final energy decreased by about 
7% between 2006 and 20113. Similarly, elec-
tricity consumption in the EU has been falling 
back in recent years, albeit to a lesser degree: 
2 This being a result of both the economic crisis and great-
er energy efficiency. See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
observatory/electricity/doc/20130814_q2_quarterly_re-
port_on_european_electricity_markets.pdf
3 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/sta-
tistics/search_database
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demand dropped by about 3% between 2010 
and 20124, and by about 1.2% in the first half 
of 20135.
The ongoing economic stagnation is present in 
the context of the changing global energy mar-
ket; these have affected the availability, price, 
and acceptability of individual energy sources 
in the EU. A shale gas “revolution” in the Uni-
ted States, the greater availability of LNG, and 
the discovery of new gas deposits in the Me-
diterranean and in East Africa, have all contri-
buted to transforming (mainly) the global gas 
markets. The increased supply of gas has bro-
ught gas prices down, changed the role of tra-
ditional suppliers, and affected gas trading ru-
les. In addition, shifts in the US energy market 
and the substitution of coal by cheap gas have 
led to rising coal exports from the US. At the 
same time, many countries have been success-
ful in carrying out a so-called “energy transfor-
mation” (most visibly in Sweden, Brazil, Italy 
and Germany; although their approaches and 
pace have varied), which has gradually led to 
an increase in the use of renewables. The glo-
bal energy landscape has also been affected 
by the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima NPP, 
which precipitated a drop in confidence in nuc-
lear energy (mainly in the EU, and especially 
in Germany). Most of the changes taking place 
in the energy markets appear to be fundamen-
tal and long-term. However, since these pro-
cesses are still ongoing, their final consequen-
4 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=ta-
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=ten00097&plugin=1
5 Compared to the same period in 2012; see European En-
ergy Markets Observatory 2013 Capgemini.
ces cannot be predicted with any certainty at 
the present time.
Those changes are reflected in, for instance, 
the EU’s energy balance, its electricity gene-
ration structure, and in the implementation of 
Europe’s energy objectives. At the same time, 
the changing global context has exposed the 
existing inefficiencies of Europe’s internal mar-
ket. So far, the EU’s market has only marginally 
benefited from the developments in the global 
gas markets – which has highlighted its rigidi-
ty and the problems related to its incomplete 
liberalisation and integration. The limited ava-
ilability of Europe’s own gas, coupled with con-
cerns about the environmental effects of new 
technologies, and a commitment to long-term 
contracts with prices closely linked to oil prices 
have also been among the factors keeping the 
EU’s gas prices high and reducing demand. Me-
anwhile, as a result of the currently unfavoura-
ble price relationship, the EU has seen a rise in 
the consumption of relatively cheap coal (inclu-
ding coal imported from the US) and in the use 
of subsidised renewable energy sources promo-
ted by the Europe 2020 strategy.
Energy prices in Europe
Energy prices have been a manifestation of, 
and to some extent also the result of, the pro-
blems experienced by both the EU energy mar-
ket and policy. In recent years, there has been 
a growing gap between the persistently high 
end prices of energy and the decreasing who-
lesale prices (an article published in September 
by Bloomberg suggests that in Germany, for 
example, the gap has reached its highest level 
in 15 years6). According to Eurostat, household 
electricity (d also gas) prices have been steadily 
growing for the past few years. Since 2009, ho-
useholds have experienced a 20% price hike on 
6 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-18/german-
power-premium-most-since-98-tests-voters-energy-
markets.html
So far the EU market has only marginally 
benefited from the developments in the 
global gas markets – this has highlighted 
its rigidity and the problems related to its 
incomplete liberalisation and integration.
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average, while last year alone the prices rose 
by about 6.6%7. Industrial consumers have seen 
a slightly smaller increase, averaging about 9% 
since 20098. End electricity prices in the EU are 
disproportionately high not only in comparison 
with traditional energy producers (such as Rus-
sia or the countries of the Middle East) but also 
in comparison with the United States where, 
according to the IEA, in late 2012 electricity pri-
ces were on average half those in Europe.
Paradoxically, wholesale energy prices in Eu-
rope have been steadily falling. In June 2013, 
the monthly average baseload prices in Germa-
ny, France, Austria and Switzerland fell below 
€30/MWh, reaching the lowest level since March 
20079. Low wholesale prices are mainly the re-
sult of a slump in electricity demand (mainly 
among industrial consumers) and also of the ef-
fects of the ongoing economic stagnation, and 
the decreasing cost of energy generation (due 
to cheap coal and renewables and the decre-
asing cost of GHG emissions under the EU ETS).
7 An increase of 20% between the second half of 2009 
and the second half of 2012, and of 6.6% between 
the second half of 2011 and the second half of 2012. 
Source: Eurostat, 27 May 2013. http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/8-27052013-AP/EN/8-
27052013-AP-EN.PDF; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Half-year-
ly_electr icit y_and_gas_prices,_ second_half_of_
year,_2009-2011_%28EUR_per_kWh%29.png&file-
timestamp=20130116115243 
8 Source: Eurostat (ibid.)
9 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/electricity/
doc/20130814_q2_quarterly_report_on_european_
electricity_markets.pdf 
The growing gap between wholesale and final 
energy prices indicates that the cost of energy 
production accounts for an ever smaller propor-
tion of the final energy cost. This is particularly 
clear in the case of Germany, where the share of 
wholesale price in the final price paid by indu-
strial customers has fallen over the past decade 
from over 60% to less than 25%10. It therefore 
indicates that the rise in electricity end prices 
across the EU has been caused mainly by in-
direct costs, such as taxes, tariffs, subsidies and 
network costs. Many of these costs are linked to 
the implementation of the current energy policy 
objectives (at both the national and EU level). 
According to Eurelectric, since the start of the 
liberalisation of the European energy market in 
1998, the tax burden on energy has increased 
by 169% while; energy companies have raised 
their prices by an average of 5% over the same 
period. This has resulted in a 46%11 increase in 
the final cost of energy and has kept the pri-
ces high even when production costs decreased 
(for example, as a result of a growing reliance on 
low-cost coal or subsidised RES).
Consequences for energy consumers
The high final energy prices are a problem both 
for consumers and for the governments in 
the individual EU countries, especially against 
the backdrop of the post-crisis economic sta-
gnation. They have contributed to the overall 
poor condition of the EU’s traditional / heavy 
industry, and have hamstrung the economic 
recovery of the EU following the crisis. Ener-
gy costs are a component of the total cost of 
production, although their share varies – de-
10 See: Zachmann, G. (2013) “Electricity without borders 
– a plan to make internal market work”, Bruegel Blue-
print, Brussels. http://www.bruegel.org/download/
parent /791-electricity-without-borders-a-plan-to-
make-the-internal-market-work/file/1677-electricity-
without-borders-a-plan-to-make-the-internal-market-
work/
11 See: Susanne Nies, “Power Prices, an increasing concern 
in the EU – and need for a better explained cost break-
down”, Eurelectric Daily News, 18 June 2013. 
The growing gap between wholesale and 
final energy prices indicates that the cost 
of energy generation accounts for an ever 
smaller proportion of the final cost of en-
ergy and the role of costs linked to the 
implementation of current energy policy 
objectives is increasing.
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pending on the sector of the economy12, the 
country, and the type of business. Typically, it 
is the small and medium-sized companies that 
bear the brunt of rising energy costs. Big com-
panies are often able to negotiate favourable 
contracts and to benefit from state protection 
(as seen, for example, in Germany). Further-
more, high energy prices reduce the competiti-
veness of Europe’s energy-intensive industries 
(such as the aluminium, steel and chemical in-
dustries13) – for instance, in comparison with 
China and the United States. They also contri-
bute to reductions in production, lower sales, 
and limit employment opportunities. Since the 
start of the economic crisis, industrial produc-
tion across the EU has contracted by about 
10%, leading to 3 million redundancies. Large 
companies are choosing to invest outside the 
EU – not only in Eastern Europe and Asia, but 
increasingly also in the United States. Among 
the companies planning to increase their invest-
ment in the US due to lower energy prices are: 
Germany’s BASF and BMW, and Austria’s Vo-
estalpine14. Similarly, at the beginning of this 
year, ArcelorMittal announced plans to close 
down some of its factories in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and France, citing high energy prices as 
one of the reasons for its decision15. Nonethe-
less, it should be noted that energy prices tend 
to be an easy target for criticism in the ongoing 
debate in the media, and some of the alleged 
plans to discontinue or limit production could 
12 It was estimated that energy costs account for over 
40% of total production costs in the chemical indus-
try, about 20% in the steel industry, and 15–30% in 
the paper industry; see: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
policies/sustainable-business/climate-change/energy-in-
tensive-industries/carbon-leakage/files/cl_literature_re-
view_en.pdf
13 In this case, the high cost of gas is equally important.
14 h t t p : / / w w w . f t . c o m / c m s / s /
be69a732-ab5a-11e2-8c63-00144feabdc0,Author-
ised=fa lse.html?_ i _ locat ion=ht tp%3A%2F%2F -
w w w . f t . c o m % 2 F c m s % 2 F s % 2 F 0 % 2 F -
b e 6 9 a 7 3 2 - a b 5 a -11e 2 - 8 c 6 3 - 0 0 14 4 f e a b d c 0 .
html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&_i_refer-
er=#axzz2n1x0MQzB 
15 http://www.steelorbis.com/steel-news/latest-news/
lakshmi-mittal-raises-concerns-on-high-energy-prices-
in-eu-760572.htm
be interpreted as little more than attempts to 
boost the companies’ bargaining power in pos-
sible future renegotiations of the terms and 
conditions of their operations in the EU.
The high energy prices have also had a nega-
tive impact on household budgets, making it 
a sensitive issue for public opinion. In early 
2013, energy price hikes sparked large-scale 
protests and led to a change of government 
in Bulgaria. Concerns over high energy prices 
have also been raised by consumers in the UK, 
where tariffs have increased by 120%16 since 
2004 and further price increases have been an-
nounced for mid-November 201317. Similarly, 
complaints have been made by German con-
sumers, who are currently paying some of the 
highest energy bills in Europe (further price in-
creases are expected next year to meet the cost 
of RES and of the expansion of the transmission 
network)18. The growing cost of electricity, he-
ating and gas bills has also contributed to a rise 
in fuel poverty levels across the EU. Estimates 
put the number of people affected by fuel po-
verty at between 50 and 125 million. Most of 
them reside in Bulgaria, Portugal, Lithuania and 
16 Compare with the average electricity prices for the 
non-domestic sector: https://www.gov.uk/government/
statistical-data-sets/gas-and-electricity-prices-in-the-
non-domestic-sector
17 On 10 October of this year, SSE announced an aver-
age 8.2% increase in UK domestic electricity and gas 
bills. It is expected that other energy suppliers will also 
raise their prices; see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi-
ness-24475868 
18 ht tp: / /w w w.sp iege l .de / inte rnat ional /germany/
high-costs-and-errors-of-german-transition-to-renewa-
ble-energy-a-920288.html
The issue of rising energy prices and their 
impact on consumers has led to specific 
changes in the energy policies of indi-
vidual states. Meanwhile, low wholesale 
prices have reduced the profitability of 
many energy companies.
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Romania19, although fuel poverty has also been 
affecting growing numbers of people in Greece 
and Spain (especially since the outbreak of the 
economic crisis20), as well as in Germany and 
the UK. Consequently, the issue of rising energy 
prices and their impact on society and industry 
has provoked not only heated discussions (inc-
luding during election debates in Germany in 
autumn 2013, and ahead of the next election in 
the UK21), but it has also led to specific changes 
in the energy policies of individual countries 
(see below).
The problems of the EU energy sector
One key challenge for the European energy 
sector is the low wholesale energy prices and 
the growing gap between wholesale and end 
prices. Low wholesale prices, coupled with per-
sistent oversupply and limited demand, redu-
ce the profitability of many energy companies. 
Consequently, this translates into changes in 
investment strategies and leads to cutbacks. 
One example of this tendency is the fundamen-
tally altered investment strategy of the RWE 
Group – the company has decided to sell off 
its DEA oil and gas unit and has announced be-
tween 2,500 and 3,400 redundancies22.
Low wholesale prices, coupled with declining 
current and projected profits (e.g. E.ON’s profit 
in the first half of this year was down 42% on the 
same period in 201223), as well as the reduced 
profitability of traditional (even modern) power 
19 ht tp: / /w w w.eurac t iv.com/energy/soar ing-ener-
gy-costs-europeans-p-analysis-519884
20 http://urban-energy.org/2013/07/05/energy-pover-
ty-in-spain-the-politicisation-of-energy-vulnerabili-
ty-at-an-early-stage/ 
21 h t tp: / / w w w.te legraph.co.uk /news /po l i t i c s / l a -
bour/10332674/Ed-Miliband-admits-pledge-to-freeze-
energy-prices-could-lead-to-higher-bills-before-next-
election.html 
22 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/us-rwe-dea-
idUSBRE99H0CH20131018; http://uk.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/11/06/rwe-strategy-idUKL5N0IR1OO20131106 
23 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7c55cd8c-03dc-11e3-8aab-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2j0pERCrb 
plants, have all prompted energy companies to 
limit investment in the internal market, and to 
close down or put aside as backups an incre-
asing number of existing power plants (main-
ly gas-fired plants, due to the growing cost of 
gas in the EU; gas is now the most expensive of 
all available primary energy sources)24. By early 
November 2013, the German Federal Network 
Agency (BNA) received notification of plans for 
the closure of 28 power plants across the coun-
try (including gas, coal and nuclear plants) with 
a combined capacity of 7GW; subsequently the 
BNA authorised the closure of 12 plants with 
a capacity of 5GW25. Similar decisions have also 
been taken by other European energy compa-
nies: in October of this year, France’s GdF Suez 
decided to close down another gas-fired power 
plant (a 1.9 GW plant in Teesside in the UK26), 
and according to media reports, since 2009 
the company has removed about 12 GW of ca-
pacity from the market. Following a slump in 
demand, one of the most modern and clean 
(opened in late 2011) gas-fired power plants in 
the world – Enecogen in Rotterdam – has sold 
one of its two generators to Israel27. The out-
flow of investment and above all the closures 
24 “Renewable growth & German market dynamics”, April 
2013, http://www.timera-energy.com/continental-pow-
er/renewable-growth-and-german-power-market-dy-
namics/ 
25 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/germa-
ny-power-regulator-idUSL5N0IP16C20131104 
26 http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2013/10/
gdf-suez-announces-demolition-of-1875-mw-plant.
html
27 Platts Power in Europe, “Enecogen cannibalized”, 2 Sep-
tember 2013.
The outflow of investment and the clo-
sures of European power plants may have 
a long-lasting effect on Europe’s energy 
mix. This may also result in an increased 
risk of power shortages during peak de-
mand periods. 
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of European power plants, are likely to have 
a long-lasting effect on Europe’s energy mix, 
and could, for example, reduce the role of gas 
in it. In the short term – and possibly even this 
winter, according to some representatives of 
energy companies – these changes may result 
in insufficient generation capacity, leading to 
power shortages (mainly during periods of low 
production from RES).
As a result of the current problems, European 
energy companies have been observing a ste-
ady decline in their market value. This in turn 
will have a negative impact on, for example, 
their future investment capacity, including 
investment in infrastructure, which is vital for 
the smooth functioning of the internal energy 
market (network modernisation, storage faci-
lities, etc.). Alongside the decreasing share of 
production costs in the final price of energy 
(see above), there has been a reduction in the 
extent to which energy companies can mould 
the sector (including the final energy prices 
and, indirectly, investment decisions). In con-
sequence, the sector is now being increasingly 
shaped by political decisions28.
Challenges for EU policy
The issue of energy prices has therefore beco-
me one of the key factors intensifying the de-
bate on EU energy policy as a whole and on 
its individual elements. The meeting of the Eu-
ropean Council held in May of this year focused 
predominantly on energy prices (both electri-
city and gas). The high prices are occasionally 
invoked by the EU’s top officials (such as the 
above mentioned calls by Van Rompuy and 
Tajani in September 2013 or by Barroso and Oet-
tinger) as the key motivation for change in EU 
energy policy which would see greater empha-
sis being placed on cheap energy and on more 
realistic policies. These calls are typically made 
28 G. Zachmann, ibid.
in discussions about the internal market, those 
focusing on the relationship with suppliers or 
on the modes of implementing the EU’s climate 
targets. This last problem is exemplified in the 
currently uncoordinated implementation by in-
dividual member states of the common EU goal 
of increasing the share of renewables in energy 
generation (through national Action Plans ba-
sed on EU directives). This is often carried out 
by – de facto – state intervention, which may 
disrupt the market (price signals). Additionally 
volatility in energy production in one member 
state may interfere with market and grid func-
tioning in neighbouring countries. One such 
example are the consequences of a significant 
increase in the share of subsidised RES in elec-
tricity generation in Germany: on the one hand, 
this has led to reductions in the final price of 
electricity in the Netherlands (and a decline in 
the profitability of Dutch gas power plants)29; 
on the other hand, grids in Poland and the 
Czech Republic have been temporarily over-
loaded and destabilised by power loop flows 
from German wind farms30.
There is also evidence that the current challen-
ges faced by the European energy sector have 
exacerbated the existing differences between 
29 h t tp: / / w w w.os w.waw.p l /e n /pub l i k ac j e /ana l y -
ses/2013-01-30/european-commission-will-scruti-
nise-german-system-renewable-energy
30 h t tp: / / w w w.os w.waw.p l /e n /pub l i k ac j e /ana l y -
ses/2013-09-04/energiewende-changing-eastern-feder-
al-states
The current difficulties have exacerbated 
differences between interest groups and 
between states. They have also highlight-
ed the problems with the consistent and 
coordinated implementation of the present 
goals of the EU’s energy and climate policy, 
and in the development of new priorities. 
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interest groups and, occasionally, between 
nations. They have not only highlighted the 
difficulties in reconciling (at least in the short 
term) the priorities of the EU’s energy and cli-
mate policies (cheap energy vs. green energy; 
market mechanisms vs. support mechanisms), 
but have also exposed the problems with the 
very definition of these priorities. Prices have 
become one of the key issues raised by the Eu-
ropean industrial lobby, which has been calling 
for a reduction in the support for RES and for 
the marketisation of European climate policy. 
These problems have also driven the current di-
scussions about the role of subsidies and state 
aid for individual energy sources31, as well as 
more general debates, for example about the 
role of the internal market in reducing energy 
prices32 and about the impact of rising ener-
gy prices on the competitiveness of European 
industry33. High energy prices have also been 
the main reason behind the ongoing European 
Commission’s analysis of drivers of growth and 
main components of energy prices and costs 
31 The issue of overgenerous, inconsistent, or even un-
necessary subsidies for RES has been raised by the in-
dustrial lobby and representatives of the energy sector. 
See, for example, the latest proposals of the Magritte 
Group: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/
october/ceos-demand-reform-of-eu-renewable-sub-
sidies/78418.aspx; while the “green” lobby has been 
highlighting the continually strong state support for 
fossil fuels and nuclear energy, see for example: http://
www.euractiv.com/energy/oettinger-scared-fossil-fu-
el-sub-analysis-531291
32 http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/article/
newsarticle/internal-energy-market-key-to-a-competi-
tive-and-prosperous-eu/#.Um914RDY9DE
33 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/23cd358e-252d-11e3-
b349-00144feab7de.html#axzz2j0pERCrb 
in individual Member States (preliminary results 
to be published by the end of this year follo-
wed by a full report in mid-2014). The European 
Commission has also recently introduced state 
aid guidelines for energy, focusing on both RES 
subsidies as well as state support for capacity 
markets. The effectiveness of such guidelines, 
however, remains uncertain for reasons such 
as: their non-binding nature, the clearly defined 
national interests of individual member states, 
as well as the measures already implemented 
by individual countries in this area. Divergen-
ce in national interests is clearly reflected in, 
for example, the difficulties in developing new 
EU energy and climate objectives for 2030, 
not to mention the actual measures that co-
uld bring down consumer prices, improve the 
condition of the power companies, or pave the 
way for a reform of EU energy policy in order 
to address the changing global and European 
energy realities.
The inefficiency of EU policy is increasingly 
being seen alongside unilateral and uncoordi-
nated actions taken by individual EU member 
states – these differ in their scope and objec-
tives. The measures aim inter alia to avert the 
negative consequences of high energy prices, 
such as the worsening situation of key sectors 
of the economy (including the energy-inten-
sive sectors and the energy sector) as well as 
the resultant rise in social costs. Furthermore, 
the issue of high energy prices is also on oc-
casion used to win public support for political 
projects and in election campaigns. Subsidies 
for renewable energy sources have already been 
curbed in, for example, Spain and the Czech Re-
public34. In autumn of this year, Hungary’s Pri-
me Minister Viktor Orbán announced another 
drop in the country’s household energy prices – 
due to government intervention, energy prices 
34 h t tp : / / p r a g u e m on i to r. com / 2013 /11/ 0 6 / i n s i d -
er-state-drafts-measure-curb-solar-subsidie 
The limited efficiency of EU policy is in-
creasingly being observed alongside uni-
lateral and uncoordinated actions taken 
by individual EU member states.
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in 2013 will fall by about 20%35. Meanwhile, the 
UK is currently implementing a new Energy Bill – 
a comprehensive energy reform package, which 
includes an Electricity Market Reform aimed at 
increasing investment in the sector, stimulating 
the economy and reducing energy bills36. A re-
form of the RES support scheme is also likely 
in Germany, where household energy prices 
and energy generation costs were among the 
key issues raised in the recent election debates. 
At the same time, individual member states are 
pursuing highly individualised policies of sup-
port for energy generation from specific sour-
ces and implementation of specific power plant 
projects. In addition to Germany’s Energie-
wende (marked by the phasing-out of the co-
untry’s nuclear power generation and a strong 
increase in RES generation), other examples of 
such policies include the recent UK government 
agreement on the construction of the Hinkley 
Point nuclear power plant with EdF, with a pri-
ce guarantee for 35 years37. Poland, meanwhile, 
has announced a decision to expand a coal-fi-
red power plant in Opole38, and the Dutch go-
vernment has unveiled plans to boost produc-
tion from offshore wind farms under its new 
Energy Accord39. The implementation of diffe-
rent policies by each country is likely to further 
increase the divergence in energy prices and 
35 The reductions to household bills were possible mainly 
due to increases in energy prices for small and medi-
um-sized entities and the nationalisation of a number 
of energy companies. http://www.budapesttimes.
hu/2013/09/20/hun%C2%ADgary-declares-war/
36 http: //www.publications.parl iament.uk /pa /bil ls /
lbill/2013-2014/0030/en/20140030en.htm; https://
www.gov.uk/government/policies/maintaining-uk-ener-
gy-security--2/supporting-pages/electricity-market-re-
form 
37 Subject to approval by the European Commission; http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/00eff456-3979-11e3-a3a4-
00144feab7de.html 
38 http: //www.forbes.pl /pge-rozbuduje -elektrown-
ie-opole-z-kompania-weglowa-list-intencyjny,artyku-
ly,157368,1,1.html 
39 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-06/nether-
lands-to-increase-offshore-wind-fourfold-in-next-dec-
ade.html 
in support schemes for individual energy sour-
ces. Similarly, there is a lack of coordination be-
tween the member states in the development 
of capacity mechanisms—instruments aimed at 
limiting the risk of energy shortages and stabili-
sing grids in the context of conventional power 
plants closures (see above). These mechanisms, 
via a system of compensation payments, are 
aimed at enabling energy companies to keep 
some unprofitable plants as back-up in case of 
increased energy demand during peak periods 
(for example, in winter). The support schemes 
which are being developed or planned differ 
from country to country across the EU (inc-
luding in Germany, France and the UK40) and 
tend to attract controversy (see, for instance, 
the concerns raised by Norway41).
The examples listed above point to two tenden-
cies: on the one hand, politics and state support 
are playing an increasing role on the European 
energy market and this raises questions about 
the future shape and the functioning of these 
markets. On the other hand, individual member 
states have become increasingly autonomous 
and differentiated in policy formulation, the 
adoption of specific mechanisms and, by exten-
sion, in shaping their energy mixes. This in turn 
amplifies the differences in the functioning 
of national energy markets – as seen last year 
in the growing divergence of electricity prices 
40 http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2013/06/11/9677291/
power/edem/electricity-capacity-mechanisms-no-sil-
ver-bullet---analyst.html
41 ht tp: //www.reuters.com/ar ticle /2013/11/22 /nor-
way-uk-cable-idUSL5N0J72B920131122
The activities of the member states, which 
are uncoordinated and vary in scope and 
direction, may lead to a gradual disinte-
gration of not only European energy policy 
but also of the EU energy market.
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across the already heavily integrated energy 
market of North-Western Europe42. Contrary 
to the official declarations and objectives, the 
uncoordinated and varying in scope and direc-
tion activities of the Member States may lead to 
42 For example, in the first quarter of this year, there were 
relatively large differences in electricity prices between 
Germany (where prices were lower due to a greater 
supply on renewables) and Belgium and France (where 
prices were high due to a shortage in the production 
of nuclear energy and lower imports from the Nordic 
countries), see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/
electricity/doc/20130611_q1_quarterly_report_on_eu-
ropean_electricity_markets.pdf 
a gradual disintegration of the energy market. 
They could also result in the re-nationalisation 
of EU energy policy, which would limit the EU’s 
role in shaping both the current and the long-
term situation in the European energy sector.
